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FootnotesThe provision of pensions is a fundamental aspect of
social protection in the European Union. This is made
clear in the Commission’s communication on Social
Protection1 the present paper seeks to build on that com-
munication by developing a number of ideas relating
to certain aspects of supplementary pension provision.
Currently there are 4 people of working age to support
each pensioner in the EU.  By 2040, there will be 2.
This prediction is the result of greater longevity and the
decline in birth rates in Europe.  The average number
of births per female in Europe has declined from 2.5 in
1965 to 1.8 in France and the UK to less than 1.5 in
Germany, Italy and Spain.  This phenomenon is not con-
fined to the EU but is also found to a greater or lesser
extent in most developed countries.
Statutory state pensions in the EU are mostly paid by
the state out of current revenues (“pay as you go”). There
are at present in general no earmarked investment
funds for state pensions. If current policies towards
pensions are not changed, there will be an inevitable
increase in state spending on pensions to pay for the
increased number of pensioners. At the moment state
pensions account for 10% of GDP.  Without changes in
policy this will increase significantly by 2030.  It will be
difficult for Member States to meet these increased de-
mands in view of the already high level of public spend-
ing in the EU and their commitment to budgetary rigour.
Several Member States have already initiated reforms
to ensure the sustainability of state pension provision,
and further reforms are being considered.  Currently
state pensions (pillar 1) account for the bulk of pension
payouts (88%), but the need to maintain levels of in-
come in retirement is likely to result in greater reliance
being placed on the other main sources of supplemen-
tary retirement income:
• pension schemes linked to employment (pillar 2);
• pension schemes taken out by individuals, usually
with life insurance companies (pillar 3).
The Commission clearly recognises that policies in re-
lation to pillar 2 and 3 supplementary pension schemes
discussed in this paper are by no means a panacea for
the difficulties which demographic change is expected
to raise.  Member States’ social security systems will
continue to provide the bulk of pension payouts, with
the emphasis on social solidarity within and between
generations.
Consistent with the principle of subsidiarity, it is for
Member States to decide on the role they wish each of
these three sources of pension provision to play in pro-
viding retirement income.  They can alter the balance
between the sources directly, by changing the rules for
state pensions or by making work- related schemes com-
pulsory, or indirectly, through fiscal incentives. But given
the existence and likely growth of funded supplemen-
tary schemes, the Green Paper explores how the Single
Market can enable these schemes to operate more effi-
ciently.
In contrast to state schemes, most pillar 2 and 3
schemes are funded:  that is to say they are backed by
assets which are invested to provide future pension
payouts2.  Even though the contribution of these
schemes to total pension payout is currently relatively
small, the funds invested to meet future pension liabili-
ties are enormous: in 1993 there were 1 200 bn ECU
invested on behalf of supplementary schemes; of the 1
600bn ECU of life insurance assets, a small but signifi-
cant proportion represents pension provision.
They are likely to continue to grow in the future. Even if
pillar 2 schemes in all Member States only grow to half
the current coverage in the Netherlands and the UK
(the Member States with the highest coverage at the
moment), these funds would increase to 3 000 bn ECU.
The growth in these funds is one of the possible ele-
ments in maintaining the level of retirement income.
They present an opportunity for the EU economy; the
Green Paper asks how these benefits can be delivered
through the EU capital market, particularly in the light
of the positive impact of the introduction of Economic
and Monetary Union. At present, employment and life
assurance linked pension schemes in most Member
States invest a large proportion of their assets in do-
mestic government bonds.  In view of the commitment
of Member States to financial stability, it is likely that
the capacity for growth in government bonds will be
limited.  This means that the supply of equities and pri-
vate sector bonds is likely to grow if the increase in avail-
able funds is to be taken up by the EU capital market.
The EU capital market will be transformed as a result,
in particular, of the increase in the supply of long term
capital. This could have with beneficial effects on EU
industry and infrastructure.
Some of the rules currently imposed by Member States
as part of their prudential supervision of these funds
seem to go beyond what is objectively necessary and
prevent the freedom of movement of capital in the
Single Market. Clearly, prudential supervision is required
to ensure that pension funds and life assurance com-
panies can meet their future pension liabilities. This
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Isupervision must not be weakened. One of the objec-
tives of the Green Paper is to consider how the security
of benefits can be maintained, removing the current
disproportionate restrictions whilst allowing a real Sin-
gle Market in pension funds to develop for the benefit
of pensioners and future pensioners. From the evidence
it seems that alternative methods of supervision can
provide equivalent security.  These alternative methods
would have two additional advantages:
• they would be compatible with the free movement
of capital and would encourage the expansion of
the EU capital market. Such a market would be more
liquid than individual national markets; and
• they would allow pension funds to invest a greater
proportion of their assets in a variety of long term
financial instruments such as equities, in line with
the structure of their liabilities. This strategy could
increase returns on the investments of pension funds
because these instruments have generally carried
a higher rate of return than government bonds.
The last point could be significant. It is possible that
some EU pension funds could increase their current rate
of return by diversifying and taking advantage of a Sin-
gle Market for investment.  Even a relatively modest
increase in the rate of return over a typical working life
could make a great difference to either the pension
payout or the contribution necessary to finance a given
pension. The lowering of the cost for companies of fi-
nancing a given pension would have a positive impact
on job creation. The Community is committed to im-
proving employment in the Union. This commitment is
borne out by the Commission’s Confidence Pact and
the employment strategy agreed at the Dublin Euro-
pean Council.
It should be clear that this Green Paper does not seek
to endorse the investment by pension funds in equities
or any other assets. It believes however that fund man-
agers should be given the freedom to invest in the as-
sets they consider the most appropriate for their
particular pension fund and that this freedom should
be exercised within a Single Market. This freedom can-
not, of course, be absolute, but should be based on pru-
dential rules and subject to supervision. The
Commission is committed to ensuring that there is no
reduction in the protection of pension funds. Prudential
considerations are all the more important for equities
given the greater volatility of these assets in the short
term. The Commission is looking at alternative meth-
ods of supervision that are consistent with the Single
Market.
This Green Paper also stresses the need to confirm the
right of approved investment fund managers to offer
their services in other Member States.  This would not
only give managers themselves the advantages of a
Single Market, but the increased competition could be
expected to reduce costs and encourage managers to
improve their performance. The effect would be to in-
crease the returns on investment, for the benefit of
members of pension schemes.
Supporting the mobility of workers within the Union is
a fundamental Community objective. Yet whilst arrange-
ments relating to statutory pensions exist to facilitate
free movement, there is no Community legislation on
mobility in the context of supplementary schemes. Sup-
plementary pension arrangements can pose a signifi-
cant obstacle to labour mobility. This can be the case
currently for moves within a Member State; the same is
true, to an even greater extent, for moves to other Mem-
ber States. The issue of migrant workers’ supplemen-
tary pensions was considered in the report of the High
Level Group on the freedom of movement of workers
chaired by Mme Simone Veil, which concluded that
action was needed to permit migrant workers to be
treated on an equal footing with workers who move jobs
within a Member State. This Green Paper considers the
way forward.
Taxation plays an important role in pension provision
and scheme design, providing privileged treatment at
the level of contributions, fund income and capital gains,
and benefit payments.  There are regulations in place
to control how these fiscal privileges are used. How-
ever, they can be an impediment to a Single Market,
both for occupational and life assurance related ar-
rangements, and can hinder the mobility of workers.
The Green Paper therefore asks what initiatives are
called for to make progress in this area.
The Commission believes the ideas discussed in this
Green Paper can make a significant contribution to
addressing the question of maintaining income in re-
tirement and to reducing labour costs.  Even if action
must also be taken in other areas, in particular with
regard to reform of state systems mobility of workers
and taxation, the Union cannot afford to miss the op-
portunity that a change in policy towards the invest-
ment of pension and life assurance funds offers. This
paper does not however attempt to deal with consumer
protection issues (such as advice or mis-selling) except
in the context of prudential regulation.
The Commission invites comments from the Member
States, the European Parliament, the Economic and
Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions, the
social partners, economic operators, representative
organisations, consumers and all other interested par-
ties on the issues raised in this document.  Responses
to the paper are requested in writing no later than 31
December 1997, to:
The Director General - DG XV The Director General - DG XV The Director General - DG XV The Director General - DG XV The Director General - DG XV
European Commission
Rue de la Loi 200, B-1049  Brussels
Fax: (+32 2) 295 65 00
Internet address: John.Mogg@dg15.cec.be
IIA.Current demographic trends
1. The demographic structure of the European Union
is changing considerably. The dependency ratio (i.e.
the ratio of the elderly to the population of working
age) is increasing in most Member States and has
already reached historically unprecedented levels.
Over the last few decades two major demographic
changes have taken place which lie behind the ex-
pected increase in the dependency ratio: a decline
in the fertility rate and an increase in life expect-
ancy. Although the long term effects of the ageing
process on public budgets are rather uncertain and
depend on the way the economy and society adapt
to the process, there is likely to be significant pres-
sure for an increase in public expenditure in the
years ahead. Much of the pressure will fall on pub-
lic social security pension schemes, which account
for by far the most significant proportion of pen-
sions in Europe, since expenditure on them is highly
dependent on the age structure of the population.
Similar demographic pressure is evident in the US
and Japan.
2. The consequences of these changes are consider-
able . The combination of fewer births and longer
life expectancy means that over time the ratio of
those who have retired to those working will increase
considerably. At present there are four people of
working age to support each pensioner through
social security contributions. By 2040 it is expected
that on average those four people will have to sup-
port two pensioners. In some Member States the
ratio will be even more unfavourable.
B.Budgetary implications of demographic
changes on state pension arrangements
3. The effects of these developments will be gradual.
The Commission has conducted a survey of projec-
tions carried out in the Member States of future
expenditure on state pensions over the coming dec-
ades3. The survey focuses on the most recent pro-
jections assuming current legislation, i.e.
incorporating reforms already announced. The con-
clusions are as follows4.
• Over the period 1995-2030 as a whole, the
weighted average5 of pension expenditure to
GDP ratios in the 11 Member States for which
projections up to the year 2030 are available
will increase by 3 percentage points (under fa-
vourable assumptions) and up to 4 percentage
points (under unfavourable assumptions). Ex-
penditure pressures will be relatively strong in
several Member States which have not yet sub-
stantially reformed their pension systems (Bel-
gium, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands), but also in some Member States
which have already introduced substantial re-
forms (Finland, France, Germany). Expenditure
increases are expected to be fairly limited (un-
der favourable economic scenarios) in Italy,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and in the United King-
dom.
• By the year 2030, in several Member States (Bel-
gium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxem-
bourg and the Netherlands) the ratio of pension
expenditure to GDP may be in the range of 15%
to 20%. Expenditure should be lower in Den-
mark, Spain, Sweden (in the 10% to 15% range),
and in Ireland, Portugal and the United King-
dom (below 10%)6.
4. At present, approximately 88% of all pensions paid
in the EU are accounted for by state pensions.  In
turn, these pension costs represent a significant
proportion of GDP - approximately 10%7 . There-
fore any increase in total pay- out on pensions by
Member States will have an impact on budgets..
Because of reforms already undertaken by most
Member States, generally only demographic trends
now contribute to the increase in pension expendi-
ture as a proportion of GDP.
C.Current structure of pension provision
5. In line with the principle of subsidiarity, it is for each
Member State to decide on a national structure for
pension provision that is in keeping with its particu-
lar needs. The relative importance of the three pil-
lars in each Member State will therefore vary
considerably, and will depend on the legal struc-
ture covering pension provision and the extent to
which other factors come into play, such as the avail-
ability of tax relief. Equally, the nature of these pil-
lars can be widely different. For example, in Finland,
pillar 1 consists of the statutory state pension
scheme and the statutory occupational pension
scheme which is partially funded8. In France there
is a very significant compulsory pillar 2, which is
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1administered on a pay as you go basis. In the UK,
there is a compulsory earnings related top up pillar
19 scheme, whilst pillar 2 arrangements are not com-
pulsory at a national level. In Germany, Austria,
Luxembourg and to a lesser extent Sweden, a sig-
nificant proportion of supplementary pensions is
provided through unfunded employers’ book reserve
schemes. In contrast, the setting up of book reserve
schemes is no longer permitted in Spain.
6. Overall, employees in the EU rely for income provi-
sion in retirement on a number of sources. In broad
economic terms, they can be described as follows.
The following table shows the extent of the current reli-
ance on pillar 1 schemes.  By comparison pillar 2
schemes make up only 7% of total payments.
EU wide pay out sources in % of total pay-out (1994 -
excluding Austria, Finland and Sweden)
Source: EUROSTAT
7. Pillar 1
This is the basic state scheme, in which participa-
tion is generally compulsory. Schemes are financed
on a pay as you go basis, where current workers’
contributions are used to fund the pension payments
of retired people. These pension payments are guar-
anteed by the state, and the scheme is administered
by a public institution. Pension benefits are calcu-
lated on the basis of a formula fixed in advance
and are usually dependent on years of service. Pen-
sion income in retirement is usually indexed to in-
flation or to current wages. The link between
contributions made during working life and benefits
received after retirement changes substantially from
system to system. Basic schemes in some Member
States will provide for a pension which bears no
relation to income during working life. In such sys-
tems there may be an earnings related pillar 1
scheme to top up pensions; contributions will de-
pend on earnings, and benefits will be calculated
by reference to those earnings12.
Advantages:
• Near universal coverage.
• Solidarity within and between generations.
• Alleviates poverty in old age and avoids for in-
dividuals some of the financial problems asso-
ciated with longevity.
• Promotes social welfare.
• No discrimination for labour mobility, between
jobs both within a Member State and between
Member States.
• Insurance against inflation; avoids the conse-
quences of investment risk.
• No selling costs.
Disadvantages:
• Vulnerable to the risk of population changes
which can make current levels of benefit unsus-
tainable.
• As pay as you go schemes have no underlying
fund, they are vulnerable to rule changes. Gov-
ernments may decide to change the basis on
which benefits are calculated, thereby creating
uncertainty about adequacy of benefits in the
future.
• Where funding is through social charges, this
can distort the labour market, through a per-
ception of a tax on jobs.
• No scope for individual flexibility in the contri-
bution cycle.
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28. Pillar 2
Table I shows the current situation of coverage of
supplementary pillar 2 schemes. The variety of ap-
proaches in the Member States is illustrated by an
example: in France the compulsory pillar 2 scheme
is pay as you go and coverage is approximately 90%
of those in private sector employment, making up
21% of all pension payments, whilst in Italy cover-
age of supplementary schemes is 5% of private sec-
tor workers and constitutes 2% of total pension
payout.  In the Netherlands, pillar 2 schemes ac-
count for almost a third of all pension payments.
Pension schemes in this category are generally
linked to employment or the exercise of a profes-
sion (an ‘occupational scheme’ or ‘industry wide
scheme’). Membership of these schemes is limited
to those working in particular sectors, industries,
professions or companies, and will be created as a
result of agreement between the social partners or
by reference to, for example, standards in a par-
ticular industry. Pillar 2 schemes are administered
by private institutions, and benefits are not guar-
anteed by the state. Contributions are set by refer-
ence to income, and payment of contributions is
generally shared by employers and employees. With
notable exceptions13, pillar 2 schemes are generally
funded, with contributions accumulated and in-
vested in order to provide benefits in the future,
rather than to pay benefits to those who have al-
ready retired. The analysis in this section focuses
on funded schemes. The link between contributions
and benefits is closest in defined contribution
schemes which provide benefits dependent solely
on the return on assets invested. Returns on a mem-
ber’s slice of the fund will depend on investment
choice, and ultimate pension benefits will depend
on the value of the member’s fund at the time of
retirement. Funded defined benefit schemes, on the
other hand, retain vestigial traces of solidarity, in
that they allow for some redistribution of income
among the members of the scheme. In defined ben-
efit schemes the employer will effectively guaran-
tee a level of benefits relating to the income of the
employee at or near retirement.
Advantages
• Some link between contributions and future ben-
efits in particular for defined contribution
schemes, allowing workers to distinguish be-
tween contributions levied for pension provision
and general taxation levied to pay for other
welfare benefits.
• Largely resistant to demographic change.
• Defined contribution schemes: benefits linked
directly to investment fund performance.
• Defined benefit schemes: employer’s guarantee
protects against falls in asset values. Some soli-
darity is also retained.
• Voluntary arrangements do not distort the la-
bour market.
Disadvantages
• Coverage  is not universal in all Member States.
• In some member States vesting periods (during
which an employee will not have accumulated
sufficient years of service in order to be entitled
to a pension) are very long.
• Resistance to complete pooling of risks, so diffi-
cult to achieve equal treatment between men
and women. (For example, if the pension is paid
as a lump sum, this can lead to lower annual
payments due to the greater longevity of
women.)
• Defined benefit scheme: the approach to valu-
ation of benefits of early leavers can discour-
age worker mobility between firms both within
a Member State and between Member States
(see Chapter V below). It can discriminate
against those who take a career break. It has
also been suggested that there could be a dis-
incentive to employing older workers.
• Defined contribution scheme: investment risk is
taken by the scheme member.
• Defined benefit scheme: where the employer
provides a guarantee, the insolvency of the em-
ployer will remove that guarantee, making the
scheme vulnerable to fluctuations in investment
values (though the scheme is ring fenced and
separate from the employer’s own funds).
• Liabilities in salary linked defined benefit
schemes depend on external factors such as
inflation, and in particular, salary movements.
• Compulsory schemes may distort the labour
market.
3• No guarantee against the effects of inflation.
• Investment returns may not match expectations.
9. Pillar 3
Pillar 3 schemes may be used to supplement the
first or second pillars, or both. They have many of
the characteristics of defined contribution pillar 2
schemes, although participation is not related to
employment or the exercise of a profession, and is
arranged individually by contract directly with a
product provider, generally a life assurance com-
pany. An individual’s contributions are accumulated
and invested, and the resulting fund in used subse-
quently to provide pension benefits for the indi-
vidual.
Advantages
• If investment performance of the underlying as-
sets is good, this can lead to improved pensions.
• Flexibility regarding contributions. It can accom-
modate career breaks and periods of part time
work.
• Resistant to demographic change.
• Neutral regarding changing jobs.
• If the scheme is a life assurance pension policy,
the policyholder will be able in principle to ben-
efit from the freedom of provision of services
under the Third Life Assurance Directive, and
so select an arrangement from a provider es-
tablished in any Member State. However, regu-
latory and tax aspects, which may have an
impact, are considered in Chapters IV and V.
Disadvantages
• Investment returns may not match expectations.
• No guarantee against the effects of inflation.
• No solidarity between and within generations.
• Cost: selling costs are generally high compared
with first and pillar 2 schemes.
• Success depends in part on tax breaks.
• Risk of individuals’ being sold inappropriate
products.
10. Group schemes
Life assurance providers play an important role in
pension provision. This can be through personal pen-
sions, as described above. Equally, life assurers can
provide management of group pension funds on
behalf of pension scheme trustees. Such an arrange-
ment falls under the pillar 2. A further option is for
the scheme trustees to ask a life assurer to admin-
ister the scheme on the basis of a group arrange-
ment. This is a “group scheme”, and also comes
within the pillar 2. Yet another variation is the group
personal pension scheme, which, though organised
through an employer, is a collection of individual
personal pension policies14.
11. Recent Member State reforms
Several Member States have in the last decade or
so introduced reforms to reduce the impact of de-
mographic change on public pension provision.
These reforms have been achieved in a variety of
ways. In order to try to maintain the level of ben-
efits, certain Member States have implemented an
increase in social security contributions. However,
given the already high contribution rates in most
Member States, containment of spending is likely
to be the primary instrument used to guarantee
sustainability. There have already been steps to-
wards decreasing benefits. Such steps include
changing benefit indexation formulae, e.g. from a
link with earnings to one with prices; increasing the
retirement age and thereby the years during which
contributions are paid, and reducing the number
of years during which a pension will be receivable;
reducing the proportion that pension benefits bear
to income during working life (the replacement rate);
calculating earnings related benefits on earnings
over a long period rather than on the final year’s
earnings; reducing incentives to early retirement.
12. A different approach is for a funded state scheme
to be developed to run parallel to the state pay as
you go scheme. In Sweden statutory pension con-
tributions are paid currently to the pay as you go
scheme; however, once new legislation is imple-
mented 2% will have to be paid into a statutory
funded scheme. A more substantial systemic reform
in the financing of public pension schemes would
be a transformation from pay as you go to funding.
Although this has been widely discussed, there are
difficulties in implementing it in the case of devel-
oped and mature public pension systems such as
those prevailing in the EU, not least the crystallis-
4ing of future liabilities already ‘bought’ by non re-
tired workers. This issue is discussed in the Com-
mission’s Communication on improving social
protection in Europe15.
One option that is being considered, and indeed
the process has already begun, is that Member
States might gradually introduce conditions which
are more conducive to the development of private
funded supplementary schemes. The level of contri-
butions is nevertheless unlikely to fall dramatically
because; not only will it be necessary to pay the
pensions of those already in retirement, but the role
of state pay as you go systems will remain a funda-
mental part of the social structure of the Union.
Private funded schemes are well established in sev-
eral Member States including the UK, the Nether-
lands, Denmark and Ireland. Recent legislation in
other states, such as Italy and most recently France,
provides an opportunity for further developments
in this area.
14. In essence, increased reliance on second and third
pillar funded schemes would imply a partial shift in
responsibility for retirement income provision from
governments towards employers and employees,
and towards individuals. Economic considerations
point to the desirability of pension systems (the com-
bination of both state and supplementary) which
incorporate both pay as you go and funded ele-
ments, as these are subject to different risks and
returns. However, as the importance of supplemen-
tary pensions increases as a percentage of total
retirement income, it will be increasingly important
for governments to provide a secure environment
for the efficient operation of supplementary funded
schemes. The role that the Single Market can play
is explored in the next chapter.
D.Conclusion
15. Demographic changes in all Member States have
prompted consideration of their effect on the fund-
ing of state pension schemes. Continued reductions
in benefits and restrictions in pension eligibility to
help to ensure the viability of public, pay as you go,
schemes is one option many Member States are
already implementing, though there are further
steps to take.. But this will have a negative impact
on total retirement income levels. For this reason
the trend towards the development of funded sec-
ond and third pillar schemes is expected to continue.
It must be clear however that the development of
funded schemes in the EU will not of itself provide a
solution to the current problems of pay as you go
systems. The sustainability of these schemes can
only be achieved through further internal reforms.
Funded schemes can facilitate the reform of pay as
you go systems by offering benefits that compen-
sate for a reduction in benefits from pay as you go
schemes.
5A.Size of EU pension funds
16. The total assets in the EU of pillar 2 pension funds
amount to 1 198bn ECU, of which the UK accounts
for the largest share (717bn ECU or 65% of total)
(Table II).  In fact, the two Member States with the
biggest funds, the UK and the Netherlands (261bn
ECU), together account for 89% of total assets of
EU pension funds.  The pension funds of other Mem-
ber States are relatively small in comparison.  This
is a reflection of the fact that they are either not
funded, pay as you go or based on book reserves,
or have a very low coverage (see Table I).  The im-
portance of UK and Netherlands funded schemes
is reflected again when they are expressed as a
percentage of national GDP (79% and 88% respec-
tively), with other Member States falling well below
this figure.  The EU average is 20 % of GDP. For
comparison, US pillar 2 pension funds total 3 546bn
ECU (60% of GDP) and Japan 1 800bn ECU (45%
of GDP).
17. The total assets of EU life insurance companies are
nearly 50% higher than pillar 2 pension funds - 1
600bn ECU (Table III).  This figure includes pillar 3
pension policies but is made up principally of all
life insurance savings schemes (that are not spe-
cifically designed for providing a pension) and life
cover without a savings element (e.g. linked to a
mortgage).  Again the UK has the biggest funds
(564bn ECU - 67 % of GDP) followed by Germany
(380bn ECU - 21 % of GDP), France (317bn ECU -
30 % of GDP) and the Netherlands (138bn ECU -
46 % of GDP).  The tax incentives given by each
Member State are a factor in determining the size
and growth of these funds.
18. Predictions of the likely growth of pension funds and
pension related life assurance funds are difficult.
Much will depend on the rules obliging employers
to provide cover (pillar 2) and on the encourage-
ment given through tax breaks (pillars 2 and 3).  At
the moment pillar 2 schemes cover 22% of the EU
working population and only account for 7% of to-
tal pensions paid to those covered by such schemes.
Even if pillar 2 schemes in all Member States only
grow to half the coverage of the Netherlands and
UK (the Member States with currently the highest
coverage but still growing) these funds will increase
to 3 000 bn ECU. If they grow to have the same
coverage as the Netherlands and UK they will reach
5 000 bn ECU. Similarly, given a favourable tax
environment, the funds of pillar 3 schemes could
also grow rapidly as more people decide to increase
their reliance on individual pension schemes.
B.How EU pension and life insurance funds
are invested
19 Pension funds and life insurance companies make
investments in order to meet future obligations.  The
pattern of investment varies considerably between
Member States. The UK and, to a lesser extent, Ire-
land stand out because of the high percentage of
assets in equities (80% and 55% respectively, which
compares to the US with 52%) and low percentage
of bonds (see Table IV).  However, funds in most
other Member States rely much more on fixed in-
come securities, mainly government bonds (e.g.
75% in Germany, 67% in France), and much less on
equities (11% and 14% respectively).  In all Mem-
ber States real estate investments and short term
placements are relatively small. The patterns of for-
eign to domestic assets also vary considerably.
Most  Member States’ funds invest less than 10%
in foreign assets.  The UK and the Netherlands stand
out, with 30% and 25% of their assets being non-
domestic.
20 The pattern of actual investment for the assets of
life insurance companies is similar to that of pillar
2 pension funds (see Table V).  Most assets are in
fact held in domestic fixed income securities (mostly
government) (e.g. Germany 75% of total, France and
Italy 70%).  Assets held in equities are much less
important (e.g. Germany 5%, France 18% and Neth-
erlands 12%).  The UK is an exception with nearly
50% in domestic and over 10% in foreign equities.
The reliance on fixed income securities in the UK is
much less (25% of total).
C.Returns on pension fund assets
21 Many studies show that over the longer term equi-
ties have tended to have a higher rate of return than
bonds (see Table VI), though this is not inevitable
for the future. The investment strategy of a pension
fund or life insurance company and the portfolio
balance between equities, bonds, real estate and
short term placements are principal determinants
of the rate of return on overall assets. Because of
the greater volatility of equities, any figures on rates
of return are sensitive to the period over which these
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equities could be outperformed by bonds, or could
go down in value. Nevertheless, it is believed by
some observers that because of the higher returns
associated with equities over a long period, and
because pension funds require investment over the
long term, there is scope to increase the rate of re-
turn on some EU pension and life assurance funds,
which currently hold a high proportion of govern-
ment bonds, by increasing the share of equities in
their investment portfolio.
22 It is difficult to get unequivocal evidence on this
potential for higher equity holdings to increase re-
turns. Any period selected is arbitrary. However over
the period 1984-93 (Table VII) pension funds in the
UK and Ireland, with important equity holdings, had
high real rates of return (10,2% and 10,3% respec-
tively).  Member States with around a third of their
assets in equities had lower real rates of return (Swe-
den 8,1%, the Netherlands 7,7%, Belgium 8,8%).
The Member States with the lowest proportion of
equities in their investment portfolio and a high
percentage of government bonds had the lowest
returns (Germany 7,1%, Spain 7,0% and Denmark
6,3%, the latter partly as a result of the tax on real
interest rate).  Other sources over other periods do
not however give such clear results.
D.Impact of differences in rate of return
23 The previous section showed significant differences
in the real rate of return of EU pension funds and
life insurance funds - with over 6 percentage points
difference over the period 1984-1993 between the
worst and best performers. In a funded scheme,
returns need to be sufficient to deal with the effects
of salary inflation over the long term. An increase
in the annual rate of return of say 2 or 3 percent-
age points can make an enormous difference over
a working life and should not be underestimated.
Assume the target is a fixed supplementary pen-
sion of 35% of salary on the basis of a 40 year work-
ing life.  If the real rate of return on assets is 6%,
the cost is 5% of salary: all other things being equal,
if the real rate of return is 4%, the cost is 10% of
salary, and if the real state of return is only 2% the
cost is 19% of salary.  Low rates of return on pen-
sion funds and life insurance assets will therefore
mean:
• either much higher contributions from employ-
ers and employees: this will affect the indirect
costs of labour, and therefore have an adverse
impact on the EU’s job creation ability;
• or much lower pensions for the same contribu-
tions and therefore more pressure on govern-
ment spending in pillar 1.
It should be stressed that the Commission is not
advocating any particular investment strategy for
pension funds. It is the role of the fund managers
to determine the best investment strategy for the
ultimate benefit of pensioners, subject only to ap-
propriate prudential supervision. This Green Paper
is exploring the role the Single Market can play in
the future to maximise the investment possibilities
of fund managers whilst maintaining adequate pru-
dential control. It discusses whether the current
rules of prudential supervision in some Member
States are disproportionate in that they go beyond
what is objectively necessary to ensure the security
of funds, and at the same time prevent the develop-
ment of a real Single Market in pension funds for
the benefit of pensioners and future pensioners (see
Chapter III). First, however, it examines some of the
asset management and supervisory techniques that
are consistent with a Single Market in pension funds.
E. Can higher returns be achieved without
undue risk?
24 Because their liabilities are long term, pension and
life assurance funds can afford to take advantage
of the generally higher returns offered in equities
and long term placements.  However, it is recog-
nised that equities entail a higher risk than bonds,
especially government bonds, and that long term
bonds present a greater risk than short term
bonds16.
25. Clearly, it would be unwise to pursue only high rates
of return without any concern for the risk involved.
Many of the regulations in the Member States fo-
cus on prudential controls designed to reduce risks
to which funds are susceptible.
26 Advocates of modern risk management techniques
suggest that such techniques allow managers to
control risk while investing in assets with greater
volatility but higher rates of return.  These tech-
niques aim to capture the return from the risk pre-
mium of equity while avoiding excessively high levels
of volatility.  In evaluating risk and making asset
allocation decisions, it is more appropriate to focus
on the relationship between assets and liabilities,
7and not solely on assets. For example funds would
tend to make assets progressively liquid to match
the date the liability is due - this avoids the effects
of last minute bear markets or interest rates rises.
Thus different pension funds (e.g. young schemes
with many contributions relative to pay-out, or old
schemes with large pay-outs relative to contribu-
tions) should in all likelihood adopt different invest-
ment strategies because their asset/liability profiles
are different.  In this way they can maximise returns
at minimum increased risk.
27 In essence, asset/liability management (ALM) seeks
to concentrate portfolios on long term assets with
the highest returns, compensating for the increase
of risk by pooling across assets whose returns are
imperfectly correlated (diversification).  Thus one
asset with a high return but which is risky (i.e. vola-
tile) may be offset by another high return but risky
asset, if these risks are not positively correlated.
28 It is argued that diversifying assets is in fact a pru-
dent approach, because over concentration in any
one asset can increase risk and reduce rates of re-
turn.  Even government bonds can fluctuate with
changes in interest rates and inflation expectations.
Consequently, over concentration of a portfolio on
assets such as government bonds, that are regarded
as “safe”, can actually increase risk in comparison
to a diversified portfolio, without obtaining higher
returns17.  Investment in a selection of imperfectly
correlated markets will provide managers with a
spread of diversified investments, and reduce po-
tentially the risk of over concentration in assets de-
nominated in one currency. One commentator
concludes:
“Restrictions imposing arbitrary limits on asset hold-
ings by type of asset, country or currency distribu-
tion run contrary to the prudential principle because
they severely limit risk diversification.  This constraint
forces pension funds to assume more risks, while
sacrificing return, and to conduct investment poli-
cies that are detrimental to their members in the
long run18”.
29 This approach to asset/liability management is the
basis of the “prudent man” management and su-
pervisory technique used in some Member States.
They judge the financial viability of the pension fund
or life insurance company by assessing the match
between its financial assets and its liabilities over
the expected life of the scheme, taking into account
relevant considerations such as the type, size, de-
velopment and rate of funding of the scheme, and
the volume and nature of the fund’s liabilities. When
applying such asset/liability management princi-
ples, managers will also work within any investment
principles imposed by, for example, the trustees or
board. It is not a laisser faire supervision.  On the
contrary, it imposes on supervisors the obligation
to ensure that the respective roles of manager and
trustee/custodian/depositary are fulfilled in such a
way as to ensure, in turn, that scheme members’
benefits are secure.
30 The role of the supervisory authorities would need
to be more dynamic if a qualitative approach to
the investment of pension fund assets were to be
pursued. Quantitative yardsticks would be much less
prominent. When examining the financial health of
a fund, supervisors would focus separately on its
short and long term liabilities and on its investment
horizon, the rate of funding in relation to liabilities
and the need for the particular liability structure to
be matched with an appropriate asset structure
through an acceptable asset/liability management
approach.
F. How could EU capital markets absorb future
increases in EU pension funds and life
insurance investments?
31 The development of funded supplementary schemes
in the EU will increase the amount of financial as-
sets available for investment. This growth will be
very significant, but gradual. This section explores
what advantages the creation of a real Single Mar-
ket could have in increasing liquidity and reducing
costs for pension funds. It also examines the struc-
tural changes in EU capital markets likely to come
about as a result of increased investment by pen-
sion funds.
32 The supply of government bonds is unlikely to match
the growth in financial assets of pension funds.
Other vehicles for investment include principally
equities and corporate bonds. These can be ex-
pected to play a greater role in the EU capital mar-
ket in the future. In the US market capitalisation is
much greater in relation to GDP (US: 68%; EU: 32%)
(see Table VIII) and the increase over time in pen-
sion fund assets has been successfully taken up by
capital markets to provide adequate pensions.
Because EU pension funds will have to find new in-
vestment outlets, private sector equity could, gradu-
ally, become one of the likely outlets for many funds.
However the privatisation of state owned enter-
8prises is likely to represent a relatively small pro-
portion of the market as a whole. In addition,
EASDAQ and stock markets for small company
shares in a number of Member States could sup-
plement conventional issues of equity available for
pension and life insurance fund investment. Other
new equity might also be issued by EU firms replac-
ing to some extent the traditional sources of corpo-
rate finance in Europe.
An additional area for development in the EU, as
an alternative in appropriate circumstances to eq-
uities, is the corporate bond market. The market for
corporate bonds is underdeveloped in the EU by
comparison with the US, where the market is more
than 7 times larger. If the US experience is mirrored
in the EU, it may be expected that the market for
corporate bonds will increase markedly in size.
33. Capital markets will adapt to take up these funds.
Some of this capital may go outside the EU, though
normal asset management practices would result
in most of these remaining inside the EU19. How-
ever if Member States capital markets are kept sepa-
rate, they will be less liquid and be less able to take
up successfully these funds. Therefore barriers to
flows of capital which are not objectively justified
on prudential grounds, will reduce the efficiency of
this process. The Investment Services Directive20 has
already removed many of the barriers to the func-
tioning of EU capital markets. In addition stage 3
of Economic and Monetary Union will help this proc-
ess by eliminating exchange risks for investors in-
vesting in securities issued in the currencies of
participating Member State. Other obstacles, such
as transaction costs and delays in implementing
investment decisions, will also be reduced by a sin-
gle currency, and should contribute to increased
investment activity. Chapter III examines remaining
prudential rules, applied by Member States, that
are an impediment to freedom of capital flows and
asks whether they are objectively justified.
34 Competition between financial institutions and be-
tween financial centres in the EU, together with the
growth in financial assets available for investment,
will lead to improvements in the EU capital market
by reducing costs and increasing liquidity. This will
be reinforced by EMU, which provides the opportu-
nity for further development of an EU-wide capital
market.
Question: Question: Question: Question: Question: The Commission seeks views on the analysis
in this chapter.
9A.Role of supervision of pension and life
insurance funds and fund managers
35. It is clear that pension and life insurance funds and
the managers of these funds must be subject to
prudential supervision.  Consumers (i.e. future pen-
sioners) must be protected in an area where they
have little knowledge.  Supervision must ensure that
fund managers execute their fiduciary duties cor-
rectly.  The regulatory approaches towards pension
funds differ widely between Member States. In some
states they are covered by regulations specific to
pension funds; in others, they are regulated on the
same footing as life insurance companies. This
means they are subject to the same minimum sol-
vency requirements, rules as to technical provisions
and investment restrictions and other provisions as
life insurance companies.
36 Whilst national regulations differ, there are
commonalities in approach.
• A requirement for pension funds to be author-
ised or approved by a competent authority.
• Authorisation or approval could be dependent
on fulfilling certain criteria, such as the suitabil-
ity and approval of managers of pension funds
and custodians/depositaries/trustees of the
funds’ assets; the legal form of the fund.
• A requirement for prudential supervision of the
fund, including regular reporting rules and pow-
ers of intervention by the supervisory authority.
• Minimum prudential rules on the investment of
members’ contributions, in particular requiring
that they be invested prudently.
Question: Question: Question: Question: Question: Do interested parties agree that these
points provide an appropriate basis of regulation?
B.The effect of excessive rules on pillar 2
pension fund investments
37. There are no specific EU harmonization rules relat-
ing to the investment by pension funds of their as-
sets beyond the principle of, and general rules
relating to, the free movement of capital21.  These
are intended to guarantee to all investors, includ-
ing pension schemes, the freedom to invest where
they wish in the EU.  The Treaty permits22 invest-
ment restrictions to be imposed if these can be jus-
tified on prudential grounds. Member States may
not use this exception to the freedom as a means of
discriminating against foreign assets, nor as  dis-
guised, non-prudential restrictions introduced for
other reasons. Further, the Treaty prohibits23 any
‘privileged access’ by central, regional or local gov-
ernment to financial institutions, including pension
funds, through the imposition of minimum invest-
ment requirements, except on prudential grounds.
The Commission is in the  process of taking action
against Member States that discriminate for non-
prudential reasons against foreign assets.
38. Many Member States have restrictive rules that
generally fix the maximum percentage of a fund that
can be held in a particular asset or currency (see
Table IX).  Germany is an example of such an ap-
proach.  It fixes the following maximum asset lev-
els: 30% equity, of which a maximum of 6% may be
non EU equities, 25% EU property, 6% non-EU
bonds, 20% overall foreign assets and 10% self-in-
vestment limit. Pension funds in Member States with
such quantitative rules tend to hold a high propor-
tion of assets in government bonds.
39. Member States’ rules defining the appropriate su-
pervision can have the effect of frustrating the Sin-
gle Market and the investment advantages it can
bring. The Commission believes that in many cases
they go beyond what is objectively necessary to
maintain adequate prudential supervision. There
are other prudential rules and techniques that are
consistent with a Single Market and maintain
equivalent prudential security. In particular, Mem-
ber States’ prudential rules relating to investment
portfolios can have the effect of obliging pension
and life insurance funds to invest a large propor-
tion of their assets in domestic government bonds.
Even so the actual investment pattern of investment
by pension funds in several Member States has in
effect not reached the limits fixed by the rules. For
example in Germany pension funds only invest 6%
in foreign assets (maximum allowed 20%) and 11%
in equities (maximum allowed 30%)24.
Question:  Question:  Question:  Question:  Question: The Commission would like to know how far
quantitative restrictions limit in fact the investment strat-
egy of pension funds, particularly in Member States
where the maximum permitted proportion of equities
is not reached.
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on investment policy if, as is predicted, funds available
for investment increase considerably in the future and
the opportunity for investment in government bonds is
restricted by lack of supply?
40. In the past the Commission has twice put forward
a specific interpretation  of the Treaty rules for pen-
sion funds: first, in a draft Directive25 that was with-
drawn because the amendments proposed by
Member States would have legitimised restrictions
on pension funds rather than liberalised them;  sec-
ondly, in a Communication26, which was annulled
recently by the European Court of Justice on the
basis that the Commission intended to impose new
binding obligations on Member States27.
The Commission believes the objectives of the with-
drawn Directive and the Communication still need
to be pursued, in a broader context: in fact all the
more so in view of the increasing awareness of the
need to reform pension systems with a view to en-
suring their sustainability. These policy objectives
may be summarised as follows:
• freedom for fund managers who are authorised
in accordance with the Investment Services Di-
rective, the Second Banking Directive or the
Third Life Insurance Directive28 to offer services
all over the  EU;
• freedom to invest assets of pension funds un-
der the “prudent man” principle; diversification
of assets, including diversification into assets
denominated in currencies other than that in
which the liabilities of the institution are estab-
lished; removal of any requirements on pension
funds to invest in or refrain from investing in
particular categories of assets, nor to localise
their assets in a particular Member State, oth-
erwise than on justified prudential grounds. Any
restrictions imposed on prudential grounds
must be proportional to the objectives they may
legitimately pursue29.
41 It is not anticipated that removing restrictions would
open the floodgates to an alternative style of fund
management. Fund managers would take time to
adapt to a new investment strategy; in addition,
there is evidence of home country bias as well as
the normal prudential policy of keeping the bulk of
assets in the same currency as the liabilities. Thus
despite the absence of restrictions on foreign eq-
uity investment, the proportion of such investment
is only around 25%-30% in those Member States
with the most liberal investment regimes. A further
observation in this context is that fund managers
very often do not currently take advantage of the
investment freedom they do have, so a rush towards
equities appears unlikely.
Question: Question: Question: Question: Question: Do interested parties agree that the approach
to EU supervisory rules described above could provide
adequate prudential security at the same time as offer-
ing the advantages of the prospect of higher returns
within the framework of a real Single Market for pen-
sion funds?
C.Rules on pillar 3 life assurance investments
42. In contrast to pillar 2 schemes, where there is no
specific EU harmonisation, the rules for pillar 3 life
insurance schemes are harmonised under the Sin-
gle Market provisions30.  Once a life insurance com-
pany is authorised and supervised in one Member
State, it effectively has a European passport and
can sell its products in other Member States.  A level
playing field for competition between insurance
companies in different Member States is established
and consumers are protected.`
43. The relevant EU rules for investment by life insur-
ance companies are given in Table X31.  Of particu-
lar significance are the following:
• investment shall be based on the prudent man
principle;
• Member States may not require insurance com-
panies to invest in particular categories of as-
sets, and
• Member States cannot oblige an insurance com-
pany to keep more than 80% of its assets in a
currency matching its liabilities.
A minority of Member States have a flexible ap-
proach to supervision, and insurance companies in
such Member States hold a high proportion of as-
sets in equities, including foreign equities. Most
Member States however adopt a quantitative ap-
proach to supervision, similar to the approach they
follow in respect of pillar 2 pension funds (see Ta-
ble XI).  In fact in such Member States most insur-
ance company assets are kept in domestic fixed
income securities (Germany 75%, Spain 55%,
France 68% and Italy 70%), despite the scope un-
der the rules to invest in equities and foreign assets
(equities or bonds, for example) to a greater extent.
11Question:  Question:  Question:  Question:  Question: The Commission would like to know how far
life insurance funds in Member States that impose quan-
titative limits are in fact restricted or are likely to be
restricted in the future in their investment strategy by
national rules.  It also asks whether the quantitative
limits imposed by Member States  should be changed
along the lines described in section B for pillar 2
schemes.
D.Should there be similar EU rules for pillar 2
and 3 schemes?
This Green Paper has examined the prudential rules
concerning the investments made by pension and
life assurance funds (i.e. the assets side of the bal-
ance sheet).The question also arises as to whether
pension funds should be subject to rules similar to
those that exist for life assurance on the liabilities
side of the balance sheet - in particular is there a
need to harmonise the technical provisions and the
4% solvency margin of own funds32. This is espe-
cially the case where they are in direct competition,
in particular where employers use life assurance
companies to provide employment related pensions
(pillar 2) in the form of “group schemes” which are
subject to the harmonised rules for pillar 3
schemes33 (see Table XII).
As regards this point, the organisation represent-
ing European insurers (Comité Européen des Assur-
ances - CEA) argues that pillar 2 pension schemes
should be subject to equivalent prudential rules
whether they are managed or operated by a pen-
sion fund or life insurer. The Commission considers
there are four options:
• Option I Option I Option I Option I Option I: make funds of pillar 2 schemes sub-
ject to the rules currently applied to group life
schemes
• Option II Option II Option II Option II Option II: adapt the current rules on the sol-
vency margin for group life schemes to the
framework currently applied to pillar 2;
• Option III Option III Option III Option III Option III: define new common EU standards
for both pillar 2 schemes and group life assur-
ance.  The Commission would be interested to
hear any concrete suggestions;
• Option IV Option IV Option IV Option IV Option IV: accept the differences that currently
exist because de facto they do not lead to sig-
nificant distortions of competition.
Question: Question: Question: Question: Question: Before making up its mind the Commis-
sion seeks the view of interested parties.
E.Fund managers
45. Authorised fund managers are already entitled to
sell investment services throughout the EU on the
basis of the Treaty as well as of harmonised crite-
ria34. These fund managers are also entitled to of-
fer their services to manage pension funds across
borders. Restrictions on this freedom can act as a
barrier to improving returns on investments, and
infringe Treaty freedoms relating to the free provi-
sion of investment management services in the Sin-
gle Market35.
46. Efficient management of a pension portfolio implies
an appropriately diversified investment strategy,
which can require external specialised advice. Pen-
sion schemes need to be able to call on advice and
management services from the most appropriate
source, which might be from a manager established
in another Member State. A fund manager in an-
other Member State might be more aware of non
domestic investment opportunities both within the
EU and outside it.  There should be no impediment
to a pension scheme’s ability to call on such serv-
ices. The Commission also considers that increased
competition could lead to lower management
charges or more efficient management of these
funds.  Even a one percentage point annual cost
advantage or efficiency gain over a working life is
an enormous saving.
Question: Question: Question: Question: Question: The Commission seeks views on this point,
and asks also whether any current impediments pro-
vide actual barriers to the cross border provision of serv-
ices by pension fund managers.
F. The way forward
47. This Green Paper has suggested that changes may
be desirable to the rules governing the prudential
supervision of pension and life insurance funds.  If
it is decided to make these changes the question
arises as to the most efficient instrument to carry
them out.  There are several possibilities.
Option 1. Rely on introduction of euro.  Option 1. Rely on introduction of euro.  Option 1. Rely on introduction of euro.  Option 1. Rely on introduction of euro.  Option 1. Rely on introduction of euro.  This option
would reduce the impact of currency matching re-
quirements for participating Member States.  Any
assets in a participating Member State would au-
tomatically be in a matched currency.  Such an ap-
proach requires no additional legislative or
enforcement effort on the part of the Commission.
However this approach would not solve the prob-
lem of any unjustified quantitative rules that limit
12investment in certain classes of assets (e.g. equi-
ties) so de facto obliging investors to buy (govern-
ment) bonds.  It would not help solve the problem
for funds located in Member States not participat-
ing in the euro with either currency matching or
quantitative limits. However, this approach could
be combined with the second option.
In parallel to the introduction of the euro Member
States might also make unilateral changes to their
national regulations in order to facilitate more effi-
cient pension fund management. Such changes
would be a matter for Member States, and would
depend on their perceptions about what is appro-
priate for their particular situation.
Option 2. Apply current Treaty freedoms.  Option 2. Apply current Treaty freedoms.  Option 2. Apply current Treaty freedoms.  Option 2. Apply current Treaty freedoms.  Option 2. Apply current Treaty freedoms.  This op-
tion would rely simply on the obligations created
by the current Treaty freedoms relating to move-
ment of capital and to the provision of services.  The
Commission could issue guidelines as to how it in-
terpreted these basic freedoms for the investment
of pension and life insurance funds and fund man-
agers to offer their services.  It would then examine
for each Member State both its general rules and
decisions in individual cases, to see if they were jus-
tified on prudential grounds.  Where the rules or
decisions were not justified, the Commission would
be obliged to start infringement proceedings un-
der the Treaty.  The case law would then develop to
show the practical interpretation of Treaty rules.
Such an approach however has certain disadvan-
tages:
• it would take time for the practical application
of the basic legal principles to become clear;
• it could lead to legal uncertainty.  This is par-
ticularly so because case law could easily iden-
tify clearly abusive cases but would have greater
difficulty in deciding marginal cases where the
border between justified and unjustified pruden-
tial restraints is not a simple bright-line test;
• there is a risk that interpretation derived from
case law, which is based on an adversarial pro-
cedure in individual cases, would become rigid.
It might not allow for sufficient change and flex-
ibility in the rapidly evolving and technical area
of financial supervision.
Option 3. Adoption of a Directive. Option 3. Adoption of a Directive. Option 3. Adoption of a Directive. Option 3. Adoption of a Directive. Option 3. Adoption of a Directive. An alternative
approach would be harmonisation by a Directive
setting out basic principles.  It would allow the in-
terpretation of Treaty provisions in this technical fi-
nancial area to be worked out in cooperation with
all partners.  A Directive could incorporate mecha-
nisms for cooperation between the Commission and
national supervisors to interpret, and update in line
with changing circumstances, the practical appli-
cation of basic Treaty freedoms for the supervision
of pension and life insurance funds. The publica-
tion of an opinion, arising from such co-operation,
on interpretation and application of the Directives
could lead to transparency and certainty. This ap-
proach has been tried before, unsuccessfully. The
difficulties of obtaining a consensus between Mem-
ber States on Community legislation in this area
are clear; it is possible that the heightened interest
in the role of funded supplementary schemes might
lead to a greater consensus.
Question: Question: Question: Question: Question: The Commission seeks the views of
interested parties.
13A. General considerations
48. Article 51 of the EU Treaty requires Community leg-
islation to be adopted in order to remove all barri-
ers in the sphere of social security which impede a
genuinely free movement of workers.
On the basis of this Article36, the Community has
already adopted legislation (Regulations 1408/71
and 574/7237), which removes obstacles to cross-
border mobility of workers in the field of statutory
pensions. This legislation does not apply to supple-
mentary pension schemes.
More and more qualified and highly qualified peo-
ple make use of their right to free movement. For
this category of people, supplementary pension
schemes contribute substantially to their social pro-
tection.
B. Obstacles to free movement of persons
relating to supplementary pensions
49. In its Communication of July 199138, the Commis-
sion started  a discussion at Community level, on
the role of supplementary pension schemes and
their impact on free movement.
As a follow up to this communication, the Commis-
sion services have explored on several occasions,
in conjunction with the representatives of Member
States, Social Partners and pension funds, how to
remove obstacles to cross-border mobility of em-
ployed and self-employed persons in the European
Union in the field of supplementary pensions.
Given the specific nature of many supplementary
pension schemes and their extreme diversity at na-
tional level as regards their origin, their occupa-
tional and material scope, as well as their legal and
technical forms, the current coordination system
created for statutory schemes does not seem to be
the appropriate instrument to address the problems.
A more flexible approach is required.
50. In February 1996 the Commission decided to ask a
High Level Panel on Free Movement of Persons
chaired by Mme Veil to deliver an opinion inter alia
on the measures to be taken in order to eliminate
the obstacles to freedom of movement of workers
which arise in the context of  supplementary pen-
sions.
The panel presented its report in November 1996.
It came to the conclusion that legislative action at
Community level is necessary but that it should be
confined, at least initially, to a three-pronged ap-
proach, encompassing the following elements:
a) Preservation of acquired rights for members
who cease active membership of a supplemen-
tary pension scheme as a consequence of mov-
ing from one Member State to another at least
to the same extent as for members ceasing
membership of the scheme but remaining within
the Member State in question.
This specific point is inspired by a basic princi-
ple of Community law, namely that of “equal
treatment”. This means that a worker who
leaves a supplementary pension scheme in or-
der to work for another employer in another
Member State should not lose the rights already
acquired in the first scheme which he would
have had preserved had he/she changed em-
ployer while remaining in the same Member
State.
b) Cross border payments: Member States should
ensure the application of another  fundamen-
tal principle of the Treaty (free movement of
capital and payments) by taking measures in
order to permit payments in other Member
States of all benefits due under supplementary
schemes.
c) Measures allowing workers temporarily sec-
onded by their employer in another Member
State to remain affiliated to the supplementary
pension scheme in the country in which they
were previously working. To this effect all ob-
stacles to cross border affiliation should be
eliminated.
As a first step towards dealing with the obstacles
to free movement arising in the area of supplemen-
tary pensions, the Commission intends very soon
to present a proposal for a Directive concerning the
aspects highlighted by the High Level Panel’s re-
port. This has already been announced in the Com-
mission’s Communication on improving social
protection in the European Union.
51. The Commission is also considering the usefulness
of establishing  a Community Pensions Forum, as
hapter IV: Facilitating the free movement of workers
14suggested by the High Level Panel. This Forum would
be constituted by representatives of the Member
States, the Social Partners and pension funds. Its
purpose would be to explore the possibilities for
solving the outstanding problems for mobility in the
context of occupational pensions. For instance, by
bringing together the different interest groups, it
could serve to find solutions to the problem of non-
recognition of pension schemes as between the
Member States. In general, its task would be to
advise the Commission on the best way to overcome
the remaining obstacles to free movement.
52. As has been indicated above, there remain, how-
ever, a number of obstacles to free movement, other
than those which will be dealt with by the proposal
for a Directive. The problems identified can be sum-
marised as follows:
• burdensome qualifying conditions for acquiring
supplementary pension rights, including long
vesting periods;
• difficulties with transferability of vested pension
rights from one Member State to another;
• tax difficulties linked to acquiring pension rights
in more than one Member State;
• the specific disadvantage of changing schemes
arising in the case of a worker other than a sec-
onded worker who goes to work only temporar-
ily in a Member State other than that in which
he/she has been building up pension rights.
53. Qualifying conditions for acquiring rights
The acquisition of vested rights often takes place
after several years of employment in a company
(ten years under German law) and sometimes only
at the time of retirement. Any job change before
the acquisition of a vested right implies that no oc-
cupational pension will be paid in respect of this
period of employment. Some pension schemes cover
however all employees of a given industry (e.g. con-
struction industry). In this case job changes within
the industry and within a given country will not be
penalised by the loss of pension rights. Cross-border
job changes, however, do involve a switch to a new
pension scheme. This can therefore be considered
as an obstacle to the cross-border mobility of la-
bour.
54. The reason for this is the negative impact on free
movement of lengthy vesting periods, either because
a worker hesitates to leave his original employer
for fear of losing the rights he/she has been build-
ing up, or because he/she is reluctant to move to a
Member State where lengthy vesting periods are
the rule because it will take too long to build up the
right to a pension. For example, an Italian or Span-
ish migrant worker in Germany may have to stay
10 years with the same employer in order to obtain
an acquired right under an occupational pension
scheme in this country.
55. Difficulties with transferability of vested pension
rights from one Member State to another including
the lack of approved mechanisms for recognising
pension funds.
On the question of transferability, there are at
present obstacles to transferring acquired rights to
a scheme in a Member State other than that in
which they have been constituted.  These obstacles
may take the form of legal regulations or of scheme
rules.
If a job leaver has obtained a vested right it will be
necessary to decide what to do with this right. Two
possibilities exist: rights can be preserved in the
pension scheme in which they were acquired, and
the job leaver will be able to draw a pension from
this scheme once he/she retires. The alternative, if
the nature of the scheme allows, is to pay out a
capital value representing vested rights. This capi-
tal value can then be used to buy a deferred annu-
ity from an insurance company or be paid into the
new pension scheme, provided of course the new
scheme accepts the transfer.
56. Capital transfer seems to be a straightforward so-
lution in the case of funded pension schemes, but is
not normally used in the case of book reserve plans
and pay-as-you-go schemes, neither of which  set
aside financial assets to back up their pension prom-
ises. Many job changers therefore have only one
option, i.e. that of preserving their rights in the pre-
vious pension scheme39. In either case – transfer or
preservation – future pay rises will not normally be
taken into account as they would be after an unin-
terrupted career with the same employer. Fre-
quently, not even expected price or average earnings
rises are taken into account for the calculation of
transfer values. As a result, there is a tendency for
scheme leavers not to get their fair share out of a
pension fund.
15Calculation of transfer values which penalise
scheme leavers and inadequate preservation of
“dormant” rights are severe obstacles to labour
mobility.
57. Tax difficulties linked to acquiring pension rights in
more than one Member State.
Although direct taxation is largely within the com-
petence of the Member States, Member States must
exercise their powers consistently with Community
law40.  In this regard, it should be noted that Article
48 implies not only the abolition of any discrimina-
tion based on nationality but also the suppression
of any national measure likely to impede or render
less attractive the exercise, by Community nation-
als, of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by
the Treaty41.  Chapter VI below deals more gener-
ally with taxation issues.
Workers who wish to exercise their right to free
movement within the Union may come up against
tax obstacles when trying to transfer accrued ben-
efits (where this is possible) from a funded scheme
in the home state to a scheme in the host state.
The transfer from the home state scheme may be
subject to a tax charge; this can lead to tax disad-
vantages where the host state does not give tax
relief for the incoming transfer, but the benefits are
ultimately received subject to income tax.  This il-
lustrates the unfavourable position that workers ex-
ercising their right of free movement can find
themselves in by comparison with those who trans-
fer accrued benefits within a Member State.
58. The specific disadvantage of changing schemes
arising in the case of a worker who goes to work for
a short term period in a Member State other than
that in which he has been building up pension rights.
Two situations can be distinguished:
• Workers seconded by their employers to another
country in the context of the same company or
associated companies: this situation will be
dealt with by the proposal for a Directive, which
is mentioned above.
• All other workers moving for a limited period to
another Member State: These workers, as much
as seconded workers, are disadvantaged by
changing pension schemes. This constitutes a
discouragement of free movement of labour
across Member States’ boundaries.
C. Possible approaches
59. One question which has been raised is whether it
would be feasible to deal only with the obstacles
encountered in the context of compulsory schemes,
as opposed to voluntary schemes. It is argued that
a regulatory initiative applying to voluntary schemes
would act as a disincentive to employers who would
otherwise choose to establish such schemes. It
seems difficult, however, to treat differently regimes
which, so far as the worker is concerned, have the
same purpose of completing his or her pension pro-
vision. To exclude voluntary systems would have very
different effects according to the Member State
concerned.
60. From the consultations carried out, it appears that
a particular problem arises in relation to any pro-
posal of limitation, imposed by Community legisla-
tion, of the length of vesting periods. However,
lengthy vesting periods whatever their advantages
in other areas may be, constitute obstacles to free
movement; so it is necessary to consider how this
problem might be overcome. This could be done by
legislation at Community level, which would impose
a maximum number of years by way of vesting pe-
riods. It could also be specified that no Member
State could increase the length of existing vesting
periods. Another option could be that the Commu-
nity should not propose anything by way of legisla-
tion in this area, and should rather limit itself to
promoting the debate at European level by the so-
cial partners.
61. On the question of transferability, the approach
discussed with Member States and social partners
so far is to require that transferability should be
allowed where the nature of the scheme permits
(typically, funded systems). In other cases, preser-
vation would be the only option. It could also be
required that the amount transferred be given a
fair actuarial valuation, both by the transferring
scheme and the scheme receiving the worker.
In order to resolve technical problems relating to
the transferability of pension rights such as the
transfer of rights only to approved supplementary
pension schemes or the establishment of actuarial
standards of transfer values, the creation of a Com-
munity Pension Forum, as suggested by the High
Level panel, made up of representatives of Mem-
ber States, the Social Partners and Pension funds,
could be useful.
1662. In order to remove tax disadvantages, Member
States could be encouraged to include specific pro-
visions on the tax treatment to be given to contribu-
tions, transfer values and benefits in their bilateral
double taxation treaties.  Although this would al-
low individual agreements to be adapted to the
specificities of the tax systems concerned, agree-
ing specific provisions in all the bilateral treaties
would be a lengthy and cumbersome process.  It
would also be less transparent than having com-
mon rules at Community level, although such rules
might be difficult to negotiate.
63. The proposal for a Directive as referred to above
will in principle contain measures allowing workers
temporarily seconded by their employer in another
Member State  to remain affiliated to the supple-
mentary pension scheme in the State in which they
were previously working.
This possibility of trans-border affiliation could be
extended to all         workers moving for a limited period
to another Member State. This would require an
agreement between the employer in the State of
origin, the employer in the Host Member State, the
worker, and, where applicable, the supplementary
pension scheme in question.
Questions: Questions: Questions: Questions: Questions:
1. Is action at Community level required in order to
overcome the identified obstacles to free movement
(i.e. other than those which will be dealt with in the
forthcoming proposal for a directive) in the field of
supplementary pensions?
2. If so, which action would be the most appropriate
for each of the identified remaining obstacles (leg-
islation, agreement between social partners)?
3. If not, how could the remaining identified obstacles
to free movement be removed?
4. Which further initiatives should the Commission
take in order to remove the remaining obstacles to
free movement?
17A.General considerations
64. The taxation of retirement provision is of particular
importance in the design of any funded supplemen-
tary scheme, and most, if not all, Member States
give some form of tax privilege. The design of pen-
sion schemes and the choice between different
models of taxation are, however, essentially a mat-
ter for Member States. Each national government
must decide which tax environment will be most
effective for its circumstances, bearing in mind the
exchequer costs of giving reliefs. The tax rules which
have been developed over many years are extremely
complex and specific to each Member State. They
contain detailed regulations whose purpose is to
ensure that government income that is foregone to
encourage saving for retirement is used only for that
purpose.
65. This diversity leads to a situation where taxation
can be a barrier to free movement of people and
the free provision of services. Tax privilege usually
depends upon a scheme meeting a number of de-
tailed rules, and, as a  consequence, a scheme that
is approved in one Member State is very unlikely to
meet the tax requirements for schemes in another.
This has the practical effect of discouraging contri-
butions to pension funds established in other Mem-
ber States.
66. Within this framework, the Commission is con-
cerned that any specific tax rules should be consist-
ent with the fundamental Community principles of
freedom of movement of persons and of provision
of services. This  applies both to pillar 2 and pillar 3
pension arrangements. For pillar 3 arrangements
the Third Life Directive now provides for the free
provision of services in the EU, on the basis of home
state supervision. The removal of supervisory barri-
ers to cross-border business by insurance compa-
nies has, however, highlighted some  tax
disadvantages which can occur, particularly in re-
lation to the tax deductibility of life  assurance pre-
miums.
67. Tax rules that discriminate against a policyholder
who buys a policy from an insurer established in
another Member State run contrary to the freedom
to provide services. In its decision in the Bachmann
case42 however, the European Court of Justice held
that such discriminatory provisions might be re-
tained to the extent that they are necessary to pre-
serve the particular coherence of the tax system of
a Member State. In this case the ECJ upheld a pro-
vision of Belgian tax law whereby premium relief
for life assurance contracts was only permitted in
respect of policies issued by companies established
in Belgium. The reason was that relief on premiums
was linked to taxation of the policy proceeds; if re-
lief were given on premium payments made to for-
eign insurers, the Belgian tax authorities would not
be certain that tax would ultimately be paid on the
proceeds.
68. In a later case the Court has made it clear that
fiscal coherence could not be invoked as a justifica-
tion in circumstances where a Member State had
voluntarily given up that coherence, for example in
the provisions of a double taxation treaty with an-
other Member State. The judgment in the Wielockx
case43 shows that a Member State should take into
account the effect that double taxation agreements
might have on the fiscal coherence that the par-
ticular measure creates at a national level. If under
the terms of a double taxation treaty a Member
State allows benefits paid to non-residents to be
taxed only in the country of their residence, the in-
ability to tax these payments should not be a rea-
son for denying tax deductibility only when the
contributions are paid to a scheme that is estab-
lished elsewhere in the Community.
B.Avoiding double taxation
69. Each Member State has entered into a large number
of double taxation agreements with other states,
both within the Union and outside. These treaties,
which are nearly all bilateral in nature, are designed
to promote economic activity by removing the pos-
sibility of double taxation, while at the same time
ensuring co-operation to combat tax evasion and
fraud. Within the Union, 98 of the 105 possible bi-
lateral relations are currently covered by such a
double taxation agreement. Where no bilateral
treaty exists, some Member States allow relief from
double taxation on a unilateral basis.
70. When it comes to the taxation of occupational pen-
sions, existing agreements tend almost exclusively
to concentrate on eliminating the double taxation
of pensions when they are paid. Most bilateral trea-
ties follow Article 18 of the OECD Model Treaty in
giving the country in which the taxpayer resides the
exclusive right to tax pension income from a pri-
vate employment. (On the other hand, pensions for
public service are covered by Article 19 of the OECD
Model, and are generally taxed in the country in
which they originate.)  Even though some recent
hapter V: The importance of taxation for supplementary pensions
18bilateral tax agreements give taxing rights over
pensions from private employment to the source
country, the essential principle of preventing dou-
ble taxation holds good. In this way, the same in-
come will not be taxed twice.
71. A few bilateral agreements between Member States,
such as the ones between France and the UK and
between Denmark and the UK, specifically cater for
pension contributions which a migrant worker may
continue to pay to a scheme in one country after
moving to the other. These provisions, which go
beyond the scope of the OECD Model, essentially
provide for a form of mutual recognition of
tax-approved pension schemes in the other coun-
try. This has the result of allowing the migrating
worker to continue to get tax relief in his or her new
country of residence on pension contributions paid
to the former one. These steps can result in the lift-
ing of barriers to mobility of workers.
C.The case for a common approach
72. Bilateral double taxation agreements have the con-
siderable advantage that they can be tailored to
the specificities of the taxation and the pensions
systems of the two countries concerned. Against
this, however, must be set the relatively cumbersome
nature of the system in that, for relations within the
Union, it is clearly time consuming to have to nego-
tiate and renegotiate 105 agreements. This number
can be expected to rise sharply with the prospect of
future enlargement44. Finally, there is no general
knowledge of these agreements, and no equality of
treatment of equivalent situations under different
bilateral agreements.
73. Closer co-ordination of the cross-border tax treat-
ment of pensions could, however, substantially
streamline the process of updating, and possibly
extending, the scope of bilateral tax agreements.
Such co-ordination seems particularly suited to the
needs of a developing Single Market, and could be
effected in a number of ways. As a first step, it would
be necessary to consider whether any specific ini-
tiatives or measures are called for by the particular
Union context. If Member State governments agreed
any rules, there would then be a choice of how to
implement them: they might, as now, be incorpo-
rated in individual agreements between Member
States; or, alternatively, they could be implemented
on a multilateral basis. It may on the other hand be
appropriate for an agreement on certain aspects
of pension taxation to be enacted as Community
legislation.
74. In particular, given the need to ensure that the tax
benefits that are accorded to pension schemes are
not misused, there will also be a continuing need
for rules against tax avoidance. With this in mind,
there appears to be particular merit in exploring
the concept of mutual recognition of tax-approved
schemes in other Member States, as already exists
in a few bilateral double taxation treaties. Such an
approach, for example in the area of cross-border
contributions, could prevent retirement tax reliefs
from being misued for other purposes.
75. The Commission’s report of 22 October 1996 on
the development of tax systems45 stresses the need
to view taxation policy in the context of the major
political challenges that are currently facing the
European Union. Chief among these are the themes
of promoting enterprise and employment46. The
Commission’s report, which reflects and draws con-
clusions from the work of the High Level Group on
Taxation47, underlines its belief that, in order to har-
vest the full benefits of the Single Market and to
stimulate enterprise, tax obstacles and disadvan-
tages to doing business within the Union must be
tackled head on.
76. The Commission’s report notes the taxation of pen-
sions as a possible area for a future initiative at
Community level, and also that, in the High Level
Group, many personal representatives called for
action to improve the functioning of bilateral dou-
ble taxation treaties. While fully bearing in mind
the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality,
the Commission considers that it may prove most
useful to explore ways of improving the co-ordina-
tion and scope at Community level of tax rules re-
lating to pension provision. Such rules would, of
course, be subject to unanimous decision in the
Council.
77. The previous chapter discussed the particular con-
cerns associated with workers temporarily employed
in a Member State other than their home state, and
the legislation which the Commission intends to put
forward. This proposal provides an opportunity to
take a small but significant step towards co-
ordinating certain taxation provisions, at least in
the specific area of supplementary pensions.
Questions: Questions: Questions: Questions: Questions:
To what extent do current tax rules or regulations (for
example, related to membership of approved schemes)
constitute an actual barrier to the freedom of move-
ment of workers?
Is it feasible to rely on bilateral or multilateral tax trea-
ties to take forward closer co-operation between Mem-
ber States as regards cross border pension
arrangements? If so, what should these cover, and how
can this co-operation be achieved practically?
Is Community legislation an appropriate and feasible
alternative?
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General comment:
Given the growing economic importance of funded pension schemes it is essential for those involved with retirement
provision, whether economic operators, public authorities or other interested parties, to have their disposal reliable
and harmonised Community statistics on institutions for retirement provision. Such statistics are to be integrated in
the competent Community framework regulation, Council Regulation 58/97, concerning structural business statis-
tics.Table I: Coverage Levels - Pillar 2
Source: European Federation for Retirement Provision (EFRP) - European Pension Funds 1996  - based on World Bank
Report - Tamburi Report
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n a p a J 0 0 8 1 7 , 4 4Table III: Assets of life assurance companies - total and as a percentage of GDP (1995)
N.B. Figures not completely comparable, owing to different national valuation rules (investments can be valued at
purchase price, as in Germany, or at current price, as in the UK).
EU total included only Member States listed.
Source: Eurostat 1997
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Table V: Distribution of life assurance assets (pillar 3) as % of total assets (1994)
* denotes countries where split between domestic and foreign assets was unavailable
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2 includes loans (61%)
Sources: Comité Européen des Assurances, OECD Insurance Statistics Yearbook 1987-1994
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The period over which the differences in rates of return of equities compared to bonds is calculated is important.  The
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market and the beginning and end of the period over which comparisons are made.  Several different sources are
given below.  Whilst the difference varies, all sources show consistently the higher return on equities.
Table VIa: Real rates of return (% pa) (1967-1990) in domestic currency
Source: E.P. Davis:  1995
Table VIb: Excess returns of equities over bonds markets (% pa) (1981-1995) in domestic currency
Source: JP Morgan -  FT/S+P Actions World Indices - Pragma Consulting
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Note: Similar figures on the returns on life insurance investments will shortly be available through EUROSTAT within
the framework of Insurance Service Statistics.
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The EU rules on investments by life insurance companies may be summarised as follows (Articles 20 ff and
Annex I of 3rd Life Directive):
• investment must take account of the type of business carried on by an undertaking in such a way as to
secure the safety, yield and marketability of its investments, which the undertaking shall ensure are diver-
sified and adequately spread (“prudent man”);
• the types of assets that can be used to cover technical provisions (basically future claims/pension payouts)
are specified (equities, bonds, etc.);
• the method of valuing these assets is specified;
• Member States may not require insurance companies to invest in particular categories of assets;
• in addition Member States shall require every assurance undertaking to invest, with respect to its
technical provisions, no more than:
• 10% in any one piece of land or building;
• 5% in shares or bonds of the same undertaking except those to a State, regional or local authority:
• 5% in unsecured loans including 1% for any single unsecured loan
• 3% cash in hand
• 10% in shares not dealt in on a regulated market, and
• finally Member States cannot oblige an insurance undertaking to keep more than 80% of its assets in
a currency matching its liabilities52.
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Table XIII: Pension funds v Life Insurance
Similarities exist between pension funds and certain life insurance products: both aim at provision of a sum at a
future date and are often granted tax inducements to encourage such provision. In some states this outward similar-
ity is reflected by the application to pension funds of the regulations similar to those that apply to life insurance
under the Third Life Directive. The principal similarities and differences are listed below.
Similarities:
• Both are long term investments
• Both involve professional management of assets through authorised persons
• The interests of consumers are crucial in both ‘products’
• Both therefore entail standards to avoid unnecessary risk to the funds entrusted by the consumer to the
manager/company.
Differences:
• Pension scheme liabilities are longer term than life insurance liabilities. The average for life assurance con-
tracts is around 8-12 years. For pensions, liabilities are very often in the region of 20 - 25 years; more, if the
pension benefits are paid from the same source. This suggests that pension funds need to match their longer
term liabilities with longer term assets.  This tends to lead towards a higher proportion of equity or property
investment than is the case for life assurance.
• Life policies are subject to the risk of early surrender. This requires appropriate provisioning in the form of
readily liquidable assets, or cash, in order to meet expected, and unexpected, levels of early encashment. By
contrast, regulations generally prevent early surrender of pension funds benefits, except in very limited cir-
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U E 2 5 5 6cumstances.  In addition, transfers to other schemes may be permitted only in certain circumstances, for
example on a change of job, and this will generally result in a penalty. The level of short term liquidity
requirement is therefore much lower for pensions.
• Similar points can be made in connection with loans.  Life insurance companies generally offer loans on the
security of life policies.  They need to ensure short term liquid assets exist to provide these loans.  Pension
schemes cannot usually offer such a facility; therefore short term liquidity for this purpose is not necessary.
• Life insurance liabilities are generally expressed in nominal terms: there is a given sum assured, fixed at the
outset of the policy. In contrast, pension liabilities are linked to salaries - in which case what is important is
real growth. Purchasing shorter term assets in respect of long term pension liabilities could be dangerous, as
there is a strong risk that those assets will not achieve a level of growth sufficient to maintain the pension
expectations of scheme members.
• In defined benefit schemes an important factor is the ‘guarantee’ provided by the employer that the pension
promise will be honoured whatever the investment return on the fund. No such guarantee exists in the
context of life insurance. This guarantee can obviously affect the attitude to investment of the fund manager.
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